UK questioned US ‘control’ over its Iraq tactics one year into invasion

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The UK government questioned the US’s control of its military operations in Iraq 13 months into the war, newly revealed documents show, highlighting the Blair government’s frustrations with its most important ally.

The documents, released by the Cabinet Office on Tuesday, contained internal briefings prepared for then prime minister Tony Blair that raised concerns over whether the US had a grip on its invasion tactics.

“The prime minister may wish to question Bush on whether there is proper political control of military operations,” the documents said.

The briefings, which came ahead of a meeting with President George W Bush on April 16, 2004, also showed that Britain believed that “too many military officers [were] talking tough to a US audience”.

The revelations lay bare the UK government’s growing frustrations with the US after the onset of the first battle of Fallujah on April 4, which resulted in an Iraqi insurgent victory.

Blair’s decision to join the US-led invasion of Iraq damaged his approval ratings and led pressure to build up within the party for him to resign. In 2007, Blair stepped down as Labour leader after 10 years as prime minister.

A separate document from the UK embassy in Washington sent to Number 10 after the first week of the battle revealed that then-US deputy secretary of state, Richard Armitage, had told the British ambassador that Bush had wanted to “kick some ass” in Fallujah.

But, it added, “faced with a dose of reality” that his actions may bring down the Iraqi government, Bush had been forced to back down.

The paper said Armitage believed that Bush “still thought he was on some sort of mission from God in Iraq” and expressed his view that the US was “gradually losing on the battlefield” and there was “no coherent strategy” to operations.

He then urged the British to reason with Bush that the United Nations must play an important role in the establishment of a political process in the country.

Ahead of his meeting with Bush, Blair was briefed by officials that Fallujah “did not show US planning at its best”, with American tactics “clumsy” and their “public pronouncements [having] raised the temperature”, worsening the situation.

The British hoped to get private agreement in the meeting that the US approach “needed to be more measured” as it was “losing political capital” for both governments.

The documents also reveal that UK officials believed that US coalition management had “never been good” since the beginning of the war.

Papers noted that the US believed the Polish, Spanish and Ukrainian governments had “let the side down”. The British also expressed their own frustrations with Ukraine for a perceived lack of support of the war effort.

President George W. Bush, right, and British Prime Minister Tony Blair answer questions from the media during a news conference in the Rose Garden of the White House on April 16, 2004. — Tony Blair and George W Bush in the Rose Garden at the White House in April 2004 © Roger L. Wollenberg/UPI/Alamy

The “coalition of the willing” had been formed in early 2003 ahead of the decision to invade Iraq on March 20. At its peak, it included 49 countries.

The documents came ahead of the planned political transition on June 30, in which the Iraqi interim government took control of the country from the established governing council.

The conflict eventually concluded in 2011 after a lengthy insurgency from militant groups following the fall of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein in 2003.

The Cabinet Office and Armitage declined to comment.